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Imposing Duties and Original Appropriation
Bas van der Vossen
Philosophy, UNC Greensboro
(published in Journal of Political Philosophy)

To justify property rights, two things must be shown. First, the kind of exclusive
rights over goods or land that property rights involve must be justified. Second, it
must be possible for such property rights to come into being. These are two
separate issues. It is one thing to say that it is a good idea for there to be such rights,
quite another to say that some person or procedure can bring them about.
This second matter is the topic of this essay. It defends the Lockean view that
individuals can unilaterally bring about property rights through acts of
appropriation. More specifically, it defends this view in light of a key concern,
namely that such appropriation presupposes powers that morally equal people lack.
Among equals, it is said, no one has the natural authority to tell others what they are
permitted to do. And so, among equals, it is said, no one has the ability to impose
new obligations on others by creating new rights for themselves.
This concern traces a fault-line in political philosophy. Contrary to the
Lockean position, Kantians argue that the creation of new obligations requires
legitimation through positive law in a legitimate political condition (uniting the wills
of all). This, in turn, feeds skepticism about the idea that property rights can stand
as moral barriers against certain state policies, including policies of redistribution. If
original appropriation is not possible outside of a legitimate state, then property
rights are in a real sense dependent on the laws of the state that define them.
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In what follows, I develop an account of when individuals can unilaterally
impose moral obligations on others. I then use it to argue that people have the
ability to unilaterally appropriate property. The lynchpin of this argument is a
certain kind of natural right – what I will call the natural right to own property. The
precise nature of this right, I will argue, renders original appropriation consistent
with the moral equality of all.
A few clarifications before we begin. First, the rights I will primarily have in
mind are claim-rights, correlating to duties or obligations (I will not distinguish
between the two). These duties impose pro tanto moral requirements on people,
capable of being overridden by other moral considerations. Second, in order to keep
things manageable, I will make some simplifying assumptions about the nature of
property rights. Many existing legal systems combine a variety of “incidents” into
complex bundles of such rights.1 But for present purposes I will focus only on a
conception of property including three very common incidents: the rights to
exclusive possession, use, and transfer. Adopting this simplified conception allows
us to avoid complicated issues about the detailed specification of property rights.
The conclusion about appropriation below can be applied, with due modifications,
to a variety of property regimes. Finally, when I say that a right is a natural right I
mean that it is a moral right that all possess unless they have alienated or forfeited
it. One can enjoy such rights without acquiring them or receiving them from others.

1. Appropriation and moral equality
See Anthony Honoré, “Ownership”, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. A. Guest, ed., (London:
Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 107-47
1
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Our question is whether people can move from a condition in which they do not
enjoy property rights to a condition in which they do by performing unilateral acts
of appropriation. An important concern, we saw, is that such acts allow people to
impose new moral duties (correlative to the created property rights) on others and
that such acts are incompatible with the moral equality of all.
This concern rests on a substantive conception of equality. According to this
conception, morally equal individuals do not have natural authority over each other.
Because morality does not appoint any among us as having superior standing, no
one has the ability to determine the requirements of morality for others – none
among us gets to author the moral law. Instead, we are symmetrically positioned
subject to the moral law. Morality comes down to us, as it were, and is to be
respected as such. Put in Hohfeldian terms, people lack natural moral powers to
impose new duties on others by creating new rights for themselves.2
This concern goes back at least to Samuel Pufendorf. Pufendorf argued that
because of the ‘natural equality of men’ appropriation required the consent of
others. ‘[W]e can not apprehend’, he wrote, ‘how a bare corporal Act, such as seizure
is, should be able to prejudice the Right and Powers of others, unless their consent
be added to confirm it; that is, unless a covenant intervene’.3

Powers are abilities to change moral or juridical relations, including claim-rights and their
correlative obligations. Powers correlate to liabilities to have rights and duties changed.
Below I will also use the Hohfeldian idea of an immunity, which indicates the absence of a
power to have one’s rights and duties changed. See Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, W.W. Cooke, ed., (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).
3 See Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (Oxford: J. Churchill et al., 1703),
4, 4, 5. Also 4, 4, 13 and 4, 4, 14. To Pufendorf, therefore, all acquired rights are the
consequence of acts that involve the will of those who bear their correlative duties (except
2
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A similar thought is found in Kant’s Doctrine of Right. Kant asserts that ‘a
unilateral will cannot put others under an obligation they would not otherwise
have.’4 Contrary to Pufendorf, however, Kant thought that rightful appropriation
was possible only in a political or civil condition, in which the wills of all are united
through positive law. Such a condition, and such a condition alone, says Kant, can
legitimize appropriation:
But the rational title of acquisition can lie only in the idea of a will of all
united a priori (necessarily to be united), which is here tacitly assumed as a
necessary condition (conditio sine qua non); for a unilateral will cannot put
others under an obligation they would not otherwise have. – But the
condition in which the will of all is actually united for giving law is the civil
condition.5
This view is popular. For example, inspired by this view, Jeremy Waldron
describes the unilateral imposition of duties as ‘radically unfamiliar’ and ‘seemingly
repugnant.’ He concludes that genuine property rights are possible only under fair

for rights of parents over their children). Cf. Karl Olivecrona, “Locke’s Theory of
Appropriation”, Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974): 220–34, p, 213, William A. Edmundson,
An Introduction to Rights, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 25
4 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 6:254
5 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:254. See also 6:261, 6:263. Thus, for Kant (contra
Pufendorf) even consented-to appropriation would not be fully rightful outside the civil
condition. For such appropriation would remain bilateral, not omnilateral – as rightful
possession requires. For this reading of Kant, see Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s
Legal and Political Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 86106, 145-59, 272- 277, Leslie Mulholland, Kant’s System of Rights, (Columbia University
Press, 1990), p. 253-65, Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 118, 136, 141-5, 159, Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 45, 55.
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political institutions.6 Similarly, Arthur Ripstein argues that ‘a united legislative will
not only serves to make unilateral appropriations rightful; more generally, it
explains the possibility of one person changing the normative status of another
through word or deed.’7 The ability to impose obligations on others through
appropriation, Waldron, Ripstein, and others worry, would make one into an odd
kind of moral legislator.8
This concern should be taken seriously. We can see its force by considering
its denial. Claim-rights correlate to duties and, as such, make actions for others
binding. Andy’s right, say, not to be touched without his permission renders certain
acts by Beth morally unavailable to her. To assert, then, that Andy has the power to
create new rights for himself, and thereby to impose on Beth obligations, is to assert
that Beth’s actions are under Andy’s moral control. Her freedom to move around
and use things exists at Andy’s mercy. This amounts to an unacceptable kind of
moral superiority. Andy’s ability to unilaterally determine what morality demands
of Beth renders her objectionably subject to his will. It denies their moral equality.9
Indeed, if Andy did have such authority over Beth, assertions of Beth having a
genuine right against Andy to her freedom would be moot. For Andy could always
Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 265-7
and p. 280 respectively. See also Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism”, Harvard Law
Review 109 (1996): 1553-66, p. 1557.
7 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 272. See also pp. pp. 36-7, 90, 156, 277.
8 See Allan Gibbard, “Natural Property Rights”, Noûs 10 (1976): 77-86, Leif Wenar, “Original
Acquisition of Private Property”, Mind 107 (1998): 799-819, Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, pp. 45,
55, and, in a broader context, Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, p. 164. The phrase
‘odd kind of moral legislator’ is taken from T.M. Scanlon, “Libertarianism and Liberty: How
Not to Argue for Limited Government and Lower Taxes”, Boston Review, Oct 19, 2011. For
mysterious reasons Scanlon restricts this argument to only transfers of property.
9 Recall that this is a substantive ideal of equality, the denial of natural interpersonal
authority, and not a merely formalistic one. It thus cannot be met by pointing out that Beth
might have the same authority over Andy. I return to this point in section 4 below.
6
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curtail or remove that right by exercising his moral powers. In such a situation, our
rights could not provide any robust protections against the wills of others. For this
reason, our natural moral endowment – that is, whatever natural moral rights and
duties we have – must include protections against the unilateral imposition of new
obligations by others (Hohfeldian immunities).
This concern is not about moral powers in general, but about the power to
unilaterally impose new obligations on others. Of course Andy can gain control over
acts of Beth’s without at the same time arrogating to himself a position of moral
superiority if Beth freely gave Andy such control, for example by consenting.
Similarly, Andy’s power to unilaterally remove Beth’s duties does not present the
same concerns. In these cases, Beth either exercised or regained moral control over
her actions. The problem with unilateral appropriation, by contrast, is that
appropriators seem able to unilaterally subject the actions of others to their control,
and thus to objectionably subject them to their will.
This concern is of special importance to Lockean thought. For it threatens to
strike right at the heart of the Lockean approach to political philosophy. If property
requires political legitimation, then we should give up on the idea of government as
the protector of pre-existing (property) rights, as well as possibly the Lockean
project of understanding the public in terms of the private. Moreover, the same idea
of equality motivates another important Lockean view: that only consent can
legitimate political authority. As Locke put it, government without consent puts
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people “under the will” of others.10 Thus, unless we can find an important difference
between duty-imposition by appropriators and political authorities, the Lockean
position becomes inconsistent – objecting to duty-imposition in one context while
endorsing it in another.
Before looking at this concern more closely, it is worth noting that it is
independent of another dispute about appropriation. This is the dispute about the
original ownership of the earth. Some argue that appropriation requires the consent
or compensation of others because the world is owned by all.11 Others, departing
from the same thought, claim that appropriation is unproblematic because the
world is originally unowned.12 The present argument suggests that this may be a
misleading way of putting things. The problem is that property rights constitute
moral relations between persons who naturally enjoy a status of free and equal
moral beings. And this problem remains whether or not the world is originally
commonly owned.13

See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), II, 4, 22, 54, 57, 58, 59.
11 See G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), chapters 2-3, Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 24ff., John Salter, “Hugo Grotius: Property and
Consent”, Political Theory 29 (2001): 537-55, p. 537-8. For extensive discussion and
references, see Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism: A Primer”, in Peter Vallentyne, Hillel
Steiner, eds., Left Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, (Palgrave
Publishers Ltd., 2000): 1-20.
12 Edward Feser, “There Is No Such Things As An Unjust Initial Acquisition”, Social
Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005): 56-80, Eric Mack, “The Natural Right of Property”, Social
Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 53-78. Cf. Wenar, “Original Acquisition of Private
Property”, p. 804.
13 The problem of duty-imposition can therefore not be met by requiring that appropriation
leave “enough and as good” for others, as Sreenivasan suggests in The Limits of Lockean
Rights in Property, or that others be compensated, as Wenar proposes in “Original
Acquisition of Private Property”. The worry is not about material goods or well-being, but
authority. Unsurprisingly, in other contexts neither answer would suffice.
10
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Note also that the present concern is entirely independent of how we
envisage people’s natural moral endowment. That is, our question is not about
whether our natural rights and duties are purely negative in nature or include
positive ones as well. The question of what our natural rights and duties are is what
we may call a first-order concern. By contrast, we are here considering a secondorder concern: who has the authority to change whatever people’s natural moral
rights and duties may be.

2. Three ways of imposing duties
The concern above is both plausible and potentially devastating to unilateral
appropriation. However, in its simplest form, it is also too sweeping. As some who
defend the possibility of appropriation have observed, we know of many cases in
which there is nothing mysterious or troubling at all about unilaterally imposing
duties on others. We have duties not to take what others have in their physical
possession, yet this allows people to impose new duties on others by physically
taking and holding things. Similarly, when people take up shelter others gain duties
not to disturb them, we can impose duties on others to respect our privacy by
requesting that they do, people can impose obligations on others by making a legal
will, and so on.14

These and other examples can be found in Hugh Breakey, “Without Consent: Principles of
Justified Acquisition”, The Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2009): 618-40, pp. 622-3, and A. John
Simmons, “Original-Acquisition Justifications of Private Property”, Social Philosophy and
Policy 11 (1994): 63-84, p. 83. See also Gerald F. Gaus and Loren E. Lomasky, “Are Property
Rights Problematic?”, The Monist 73 (1990): 483-503, p. 492.
14
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These authors conclude that there is no deep problem with the unilateral
imposition of duties. However, this is too quick as well. For while we cannot rule out
the possibility of duty-imposition altogether, this does little to remove the concern
identified above. We still have good reason to be suspicious about one person
having the unilateral ability to impose new duties on others. And indeed, there are
equally plausible cases where unilateral imposition of new duties does look
problematic. For example, I cannot impose on you the obligation to read my papers,
meet me for coffee tomorrow, or help me around the house.
These are silly cases, of course, but the general point stands: we enjoy broad
protections against having new obligations imposed. What we need, then, is a way of
distinguishing problematic cases of duty-imposition from unproblematic ones.
Developing such a distinction is the task of this section. In doing so, I will develop a
more precise statement of the concern described above.
Consider two simple examples where one person can impose new duties
without the consent of others:
(A) Andy shaved his head in the past. One day, Andy decides to again grow his
hair. As a result, Beth now has a duty not to touch Andy’s hair without his
permission
(B) Long ago, Andy waived his right against Beth that she not touch him without
his permission. One day, Andy retracts his permission. As a result, Beth now
has a duty not to touch Andy
Both cases look like the kind of duty-imposition in which we are interested. For in
both cases, (i) Andy’s actions have the result of imposing on Beth an obligation that
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she did not have before, and (ii) the imposition of this obligation did not require
Beth’s consent.
Yet neither case seems to pose the worry identified in the previous section.
Despite the fact that Andy manages to change Beth’s duties without her consent, it
seems unnatural (indeed slightly hysterical) to say that Andy has arrogated to
himself a position of moral superiority or subjected Beth to his will. The reason in
both cases is the same: while Andy changed what actions are morally required of
Beth, Andy did not do so by means available only to some “odd kind of moral
legislator.” To see this, let us look at these cases in more detail.
(A) What actions are required by our moral duties depends on two things.
First, it depends on normative propositions spelling out the nature and point of our
moral duties as such. Second, it depends on non-normative propositions, including
those that describe facts about the external world. The practical implications of our
duties are thus determined by facts described by both these kinds of propositions.
As a result, for us to know what morality requires of us, we need to know what
practical acts are consistent with our moral duties. Facts such as Andy’s having hair
can thus partially determine what practical acts are required by our duties. And by
altering such non-normative facts about the world, Andy can alter what concrete
duties Beth is under. Let us call these cases: duty-alteration.
Duty-alteration does not involve persons objectionably asserting themselves
as others’ moral superiors. For Andy’s decision to grow his hair did not bring about
any change to what morality as such requires of Beth: Beth’s duty remained the
same as it was before, a duty not to touch Andy without his permission. Andy’s
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decision to grow his hair only altered non-normative facts about the world and thus
what practical acts of Beth’s are consistent with that duty. Thus in case (A) Andy is
no moral legislator for Beth; he does not have control over what morality as such
requires of her. Andy only has some control over parts of the external world.15
(B) The second case we may call duty-activation. Here Andy (re-)activates a
duty that was already incumbent on Beth. Cases of duty-activation are different
from duty-alteration in that they involve Andy imposing a duty on Beth not by
changing some non-normative fact about the world, but by exercising a more
directly moral kind of control over her actions. In that sense, duty-activation lies
closer to what the concern above claims to rule out.
However, again this is not a plausible instance of Andy objectionably acting
as a moral legislator. For while duty-activation involves Andy bringing about a
directly moral change for Beth, Andy still lacks the ability to determine what
morality as such demands of Beth. Andy’s actions merely (re-)activate a duty
already incumbent on Beth on grounds that have nothing to do with Andy’s
decisions or will, but with the nature of morality. Beth’s duty, which Andy is now
(re-)activating, applies to her irrespective of Andy’s decision. Much less than

Duty-alteration is a widespread phenomenon. It can happen, for example, when people
have moral reason for coordinating their actions. If a convention exists to drive on the right
side of the road, others entering the road are morally obligated to conform to the existing
convention. And this convention may have come about simply as the result of Andy one day
starting to drive on that side of the road, with others following suit. Again, Andy achieved
this by altering only non-moral facts about the world.
15
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pretending to author the moral law, Andy’s act of duty-activation presupposes a
prior right that morality affords him.16
Duty-alteration and duty-activation thus do not involve any special moral
legislative authority. This explains the plausible examples offered above in support
of the possibility of unilateral appropriation: these are cases of duty-alteration or
duty-activation. Occupying public spaces or shelter, for example, is best understood
as a case of duty-alteration. It does not lead to lasting rights over that space, but to
something more like use-rights, lasting for as long as one is using that space. This is
so because such cases involve the alteration of already existing duties of others,
such as their duties of civility. The same is true for the right to hold what is in one’s
physical possession. Since no one could snatch the apple from my hand without
thereby violating the duty not to touch my person without my permission, my
physically taking the apple altered what physical acts are consistent with other
people’s prior duties.17 On the other hand, requests for privacy or the making of
legal wills seem best understood as cases in which a person exercises or insists on
rights already held. In the case of privacy requests, one activates the prior duties of

Duty-activation can take subtle forms. Suppose Beth promised Andy to help him around
the house today. Andy may then unilaterally impose a duty on Beth to clean his windows, a
duty she did not have before, by requesting that she do so. Andy would thereby activate that
particular duty, which is subsumed under Beth’s more general self-imposed duty. Here, too,
Andy’s action is not the source of Beth’s obligation, and thus here too Andy is not pitted as
morally superior to Beth. For an argument that all valid requests require pre-existing moral
requirements to respect such requests, see David Enoch, “Giving Practical Reasons”,
Philosophers' Imprint 11 (2011).
17 This seems to be Kant’s justification of what he called ‘empirical possession’ in the
Metaphysics of Morals. It is telling that Kant did not think that such empirical possession is
problematic.
16
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others to respect one’s privacy. In the case of a legal will, one exercises one’s legal
right to determine who gets what after one’s death.
It is correct, then, to insist that unilateral duty-imposition is a common and
unproblematic feature of moral life. Unfortunately, however, because they are cases
of duty-alteration or duty-activation, these examples fail to show that the concern
from the previous section is toothless. The point of that concern, after all, is to object
against the possibility of unilateral appropriation on the grounds that such acts
impose on others new obligations. Arthur Ripstein, for example, explicitly speaks of
acquisition as imposing new obligations and contrasts this with cases in which ‘one
person’s act does not change any other person’s obligations, but merely the way in
which antecedent obligations apply.’18 Similarly, Jeremy Waldron emphasizes that
appropriation foists on others ‘obligations which they did not have before.’19
This concern is aimed at cases that presuppose persons having the power to
create genuinely new duties. Such powers would make them into moral legislators,
whose wills determine the demands of morality. Whereas in neither cases of dutyalteration nor duty-activation Andy’s will was what we may call the source of Beth’s
duties, this would be the case here. Let us call this: duty-creation. In cases of dutycreation, Andy supposedly has the ability to conjure up entirely new moral
requirements for Beth, ex nihilo as it were, just because it is his will.20

Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 151. The latter, according to Ripstein, requires no such
thing as omnilateral authorization. See also pp. 153ff for repeated mention of these claims.
19 Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 267. See also Waldron, “Kant’s Legal
Positivism”, p. 1557. See also Daniel Attas, “The Negative Principle of Just Appropriation”,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 343-72.
20 One might wonder whether the analysis here depends on a particular way of
individuating rights and obligations. Perhaps on a more coarse-grained analysis duty18
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We can illustrate the concern about duty-creation by returning to the
analogous issue of political authority. Such authority is problematic precisely
because it seems to require that governments have the power to bring about
genuinely new obligations for their subjects. This is why Locke worried that
authority without consent puts people “under the will” of others. Consent solves this
problem because it involves people freely taking on an obligation to obey the
authority, which it can then activate.21
If unilateral appropriation involves duty-creation, then the concern above is
damning. For acts that require duty-creation really are at odds with the fact that,
among equals, no one can have such powers.

3. The natural right to own property
There is, however, a way in which individuals might be able to acquire property
rights over previously unowned objects without the consent of others. The key to
this, I will argue, is that among our natural moral rights figures a natural right to
own property.
alteration and duty-activation do not involve the creation of new duties, but see Beth’s duty
before and after Andy’s acts as identical: not to touch him without his consent. As far as I
can tell, nothing of significance hangs on this as long as both the charge of duty-imposition
and the solution offered individuate rights and duties in the same manner. Thus, should the
coarse-grained analysis prove correct, section 4 can be read as defending, mutatis mutandis,
a coarse-grained right to property. The same conclusion follows since such a right again
avoids the problem of duty-imposition. In the text I adopt a more fine-grained analysis since
it puts the Kantian concern in its strongest form.
21 Authorities can also, of course, alter duties. David Estlund distinguishes what he thinks is
genuine authority from what he labels side-effect cases. Duty-alteration probably qualifies as
a side-effect case. See David Estlund, Democratic Authority, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2007), p. 143. But see William A. Edmundson, “Political Authority, Moral Powers and
the Intrinsic Value of Obedience”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2010): 179–91, David
Enoch, “Authority and Reason-Giving”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2012,
Early View)
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Andy’s ability to unilaterally obligate Beth through his appropriation means
that he has a Hohfeldian power to bring about obligations for her. Correlatively,
Beth has a liability against Andy to have these obligations imposed. This liability
represents a conditional obligation for Beth. She has an obligation subject to certain
conditions being satisfied – in this case Andy’s successfully exercising his power.
And since Beth’s resultant obligation will correlate to Andy’s resultant claim-right,
we can similarly describe Andy’s power as his conditional claim-right to own what
he appropriates. That is, Andy has the right to own objects if he successfully
appropriates them. This, I claim, is Andy’s natural right to own property.22
This natural right to own property is not the kind of property right with
which we are familiar in our everyday lives, like this or that person’s right over this
or that object. It is not, in other words, a right we have to any particular thing.
Instead, as a conditional right, it is the right to be the owner of objects if certain
conditions are satisfied. This conditional right precedes, both logically and
temporally, the rights over particular objects that we ordinarily think of when we
say someone has a property right.
Such a conditional right can become the kind of concrete property right with
which we are familiar in everyday life by becoming attached, so to speak, to
particular objects. More specifically, people’s natural conditional rights to own
property can be turned into regular property rights by their performing

I do not mean to suggest that all powers can be understood as conditional claim-rights.
The judge’s power to sentence the defendant, for example, might not be best understood as
a conditional claim on the part of the judge. I only maintain that this analysis applies to the
subset of powers that allow one to create claim-rights for oneself.
22
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appropriative acts on unowned objects.23 Acts of appropriation satisfy the
conditions of people’s natural right to own property. As such, they turn conditional
rights to own property into regular rights over particular objects.
Correlative to the conditional right to own property are others’ conditional
obligations. These are obligations that we respect others as the rightful owners of
the objects they successfully appropriate. Given that the conditional right is a
natural right, we all initially owe these (natural) conditional obligations to everyone
else. One person’s act of appropriation, then, turns the conditional obligations of all
others into regular obligations to respect her property rights over what she
appropriated.
We can now see how the charge of duty-creation may be avoided. If people
have such natural conditional rights to own property, and if others therefore have
conditional natural duties to respect their property rights, then acts of
appropriation do not involve duty-creation. Andy’s conditional right, and Beth’s
conditional obligation, exist whether or not their conditions are satisfied. What
Andy’s act of appropriation does is change the content of Beth’s obligation by
turning her conditional obligation into a regular one.
Andy’s act, therefore, does not create any genuinely new moral obligations.
He is not some odd kind of moral legislator. By his appropriation, Andy manipulates
certain non-normative facts about the world, facts that “trigger” his natural
conditional right. Thus the property rights that result from appropriation are
Henceforth I will use the term “regular” to refer to rights and obligations that are not
conditional on the performance of present or future appropriative acts. Such rights and
obligations can nonetheless be conditional on other facts, both because they are pro tanto
and because of provisos introduced below.
23
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continuous with our natural conditional rights to own property. The former just are
the latter in a different form.
The same, of course, is true of Beth's duties. By his act of appropriation,
manipulating non-normative facts about the world, Andy succeeds in unilaterally
changing Beth’s pre-existing moral duties. And so Beth's resultant regular duty just
is her initial conditional duty in a different form. Acts of appropriation therefore
stand to our natural rights to own property in the same way as acts of growing our
hair stand to our natural right that others not touch us without our consent. This
means that Andy’s act of appropriation involves duty-alteration, not duty-creation.24
We can express the difference between appropriation as duty-creation and
duty-alteration as follows. If successful appropriation involves duty-creation, then
people are to acquire an entirely new duty once certain conditions are satisfied.
Such acts can be described as follows:
(1)

For all persons A and B at times t1 and t2, if A performs appropriative
act P on object O under conditions C at t1, then A has a right that B
respect A as the rightful owner of O at t2.

Since this is a little cumbersome, let us henceforth take P to refer to an
appropriative act performed on object O25 under conditions C, and R(O) stand for a
property right over O. We can then express the idea of duty-creation in (1) as
follows:
The cumbersome term "natural conditional right to own property" is an attempt to
express this continuity of the natural conditional right and the resultant regular property
right. More precise, but even more cumbersome, would be the term “natural conditional
right to own the object one appropriates.”
25 I do not wish to exclude here the possibility that appropriative acts need not be
performed on objects. I use the locution for simplicity.
24
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(1')

PA,t1(O)  RA,B,t2(O)

Coming at this from the other end, given the correlativity of claim-rights to property
and duties, we might also describe the acquisition of a property right in terms of the
duties for others that follow, where D(O) stands for a duty correlative to a property
right:
(2)

PA,t1(O)  DB,A,t2(O)

If this accurately captured the nature of appropriation, then such acts would indeed
involve duty-creation. For here it seems that if a certain condition is satisfied, a
genuinely new right or duty appears, one that did not exist prior to this event.
However, we can express the idea of how appropriation leads to property
rights and correlating duties in a different way as well. We can express the right in
(1) as having wide scope, meaning the conditional is contained within the scope of
the right operator:26
(3)

For all persons A and B at times t1 and t2, A has a right against B that
[B respect A as the rightful owner of O at t2 on the condition that A
performs appropriative act P on object O under conditions C at t1].

The natural right to own property here is a right that the conditional within the
brackets obtains. For short:
(3')

RA,B (Ot2/Pt1)27

For discussion of the difference between a narrow-scope and wide-scope reading of the
right, see the Appendix below.
27 I refrain from analyzing conditional rights by putting a material conditional within the
scope of the right operator because such rights seem better described in terms of
conditional rights proper, as I do here. For discussion, see Michael Zimmerman, The Concept
of Moral Obligation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 118, note 10. The
difference matters in some contexts. For example, it may stave off Judith Jarvis Thomson’s
26
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Such a wide-scope right correlates to a similarly wide-scoped conditional duty of B
owed to A to respect A as the rightful owner of O on the condition that A performs P
on O under conditions C. For short:
(4)

DB,A(Ot2/Pt1)
This is the idea of a natural conditional right to own property that I defend

here. The idea is that people have a natural wide-scope conditional right to own
property that can become a regular property right as a result of the performance of
an appropriative act that satisfies that right’s condition. That is, the idea is that
people who have the right in (3) can obtain a regular property right to O by
satisfying the condition P. Similarly the idea here is that people have natural
conditional duties to respect the property rights of others over the objects they have
successfully appropriated. That is, people who have the duty in (4) can come under
regular duties to respect others as the rightful owners of O if those persons satisfy
the condition P. As a result, in this case A’s act of appropriation is not an act of dutycreation, but an act of duty-alteration – one in which a prior conditional duty is
made into a regular one by A’s manipulating non-normative facts (satisfying the
conditional’s antecedent). The natural conditional right to own property therefore
avoids the problems of duty-creation.28

objection that, since D(PA) is equivalent to D(~P v A), conditional obligations (or rights)
have absurd implications because detachment from wide-scope disjunctive obligations has
absurd implications. See J.J. Thomson, “Rights and Compensation”, in Rights, Restitution &
Risk, William Parent, ed., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 72-3. The
present view escapes this objection since D(PA) is not equivalent to D(A/P) nor, it seems,
does D(~P v A), which causes the trouble in Thomson’s argument, imply D(A/P).
28 It is worth noting the difference between my argument and a related view proposed by
Eric Mack. The natural right defended here is basically a right of ownership, in conditional
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So far all I have done is outline a possible way in which unilateral
appropriation might avoid the problem of duty-creation. I have not, of course,
shown that people actually have such a natural right. Defending this will be the task
of the next section. Before turning to that, let me point out an interesting implication
of this view. If people have a conditional right to own property, then acts of
appropriation as such (labor, first occupancy, or whatever) need not have the moral
significance that is traditionally attributed to them. After all, the property rights that
result from appropriation are derivative of people’s prior natural conditional rights.
All the justificatory work, therefore, happens at the stage of the prior
conditional right. And the significance of acts of appropriation is merely that they
satisfy this right’s antecedent. It is a mistake, therefore, to think, as Waldron writes,
that ‘the deliberate act of acquisition is itself the sole and intrinsic basis of the
obligation to respect the agent’s control over the resource.’29 And it is no challenge
to the Lockean view that appropriation can involve labor, consequently, to point out
that there is no “moral magic” in mere physical acts such as laboring. It is nothing
about labor as such that makes appropriation possible. It is the effect laboring has
on our natural conditional rights. The appropriator’s act of labor is no more special
than growing our hair.30

form. Mack, by contrast, argues that all persons have a ‘right not to be precluded from
engaging in the acquisition’. See Mack, “The Natural Right of Property”, 54 (my emphasis).
29 Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 270
30 So what kind of act might count as an act of appropriation? The natural conditional right
to own property simply leaves this question open. I have attempted to provide such an
account, and defend it as consistent with Locke’s view, in Bas van der Vossen, “What Counts
as Original Appropriation”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 8 (2009): 355-373.
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Should we accept this view? The argument here presupposes that, in cases
where person A performs appropriative act P on object O, the following argument is
sound:
(i)

For all persons A and B at times t1 and t2, A has a right against B that [B
respect A as the rightful owner of O at t2 on the condition that A performs
appropriative act P on object O under conditions C at t1].

(ii)

A performs P on O under conditions C at t1

(iii)

Therefore, A has a right against B that B respect A as the rightful owner of
O at t2

Premise (i) asserts that A has a right against B that the conditional within the
brackets obtain. This is what I described in (3’) as RA,B (Ot2/Pt1). Premise (ii) asserts
that A satisfies the condition specified in A’s conditional right at t1.
The syllogism is valid (see Appendix). The key claim to establish, then, is that
premise (i) is true. I turn to this now.

4. Defending the natural right to own property
The natural conditional right to own property, recall, is a right to a kind of
ownership, subject to certain conditions being satisfied, involving at least these
three incidents: the right to exclusive possession, use, and transfer. In order to
defend the claim that people have such a natural right to property, I will appeal to
what I take to be the most widely accepted theory of rights, Joseph Raz’s interesttheory. I do not here defend the interest-theory itself, nor do I want to preclude the
possibility of defending the natural right to own property in other ways (it is
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plausible, for example, that the right can also be defended on a choice-theory of
rights). My aim is only to show that the natural right to own property can be
defended on these grounds.
According to Raz’s formulation of the interest-theory:
“X has a right” if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of
X’s well-being (his interest) is a suﬃcient reason for holding some other
person(s) to be under a duty.31
On this view, two things must be shown in order to establish that someone has a
certain right. The person must have morally important interests in having a right
that correlates to duties for others, and these interests must be sufficient to justify
those duties.
To justify the natural right to own property, then, it must first be shown that
all persons have morally important interests in being able to acquire property, and
specifically to unilaterally bring it about that they enjoy exclusive rights of
possession, use, and transfer of property. Second, it must be shown that these
interests are sufficient to justify the correlative conditional duties for others. I will
take these tasks in turn.
The natural conditional right to own property serves a number of morally
important interests shared by all persons. I mention three: (A) our autonomy-based
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 166. Two
clarifications. First, in addition to Raz’s principle, I will assume that the relevant duties are
owed to the right-holder. Second, just like not all powers are conditional rights (see note 22
above), not all conditional rights are powers. Two necessary conditions for a conditional
right to award a power to person A are (i) the condition which activates the duty is an
action of A, (ii) the duty is conditional on A’s action because it is in A’s interest to be able to
activate the duty at will. This is the kind of right I defend here. See Raz, The Morality of
Freedom, pp. 167-8.
31
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interests in being able to appropriate and own particular objects, (B) our welfarebased interests in being able to help bring about and participate in a society where
property exists, and (C) our interests in being able to satisfy interests (A) and (B)
through unilateral action.
(A) All persons have important autonomy-based interests in being able to
appropriate and own property. In some ways, this is obvious. Rights to the exclusive
possession and use of property are instrumental in securing the necessities of life
such as the food, drink, shelter, and clothing we have acquired. They protect the
goods and resources we possess, and enable us to enjoy them without interference.
Property rights also help us secure what we need in addition to these necessities in
order to live a moderately comfortable and secure existence.
The availability of such resources increases the options and choices we have
available. Property rights thus serve our autonomy-based interests. The absence of
control and access to goods and resources diminishes, and in extreme cases denies,
our ability to live autonomously. The ability to bring about for ourselves rights of
exclusive possession and use in objects and resources is instrumental to
autonomous living.
Rights to transfer serve the same interests because they offer another way of
acquiring goods. Appropriation is one important way of acquisition, but we are
unlikely to get all we need (let alone desire) through appropriation alone. Thus
initial allocation of resources brought about through unilateral appropriations may
need to change. Rights of transfer enable us to exchange what we have for other
things on terms that both parties can accept. The ability to create transferable rights
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in objects thus greatly increases the total set of goods and objects to which we
potentially have access.
Property rights serve our autonomy-based interests in less obvious but more
fundamental ways too. Central to a full and meaningful life are the projects and
commitments we develop. These inevitably require control over, and use of, parts of
the external world. Art requires materials, starting a business requires capital,
retirement requires savings, to name but a few simple examples. The significance of
control over these resources is not only that it makes our projects practically
possible. The means we use to pursue our projects can become integral parts of
them. The artist’s use of materials, the business owner’s allocation of capital, and the
retiree’s spending and saving decisions are constitutive elements of their projects.
Morally important connections arise, then, between our projects and the
means we employ for them. And these particular means cannot be replaced,
substituted, or taken away without significant loss. The ability to appropriate thus
serves our autonomy-based interests in another way as well. It allows us to bring
about the moral connections with the external world that become important parts of
our personal projects.
Property rights serve these interests in ways that rights of mere access or
usufruct cannot. Our projects require that we have control over our means,
including the control to use or exchange them. To honor the value of people’s
projects, then, we must respect them as the appropriators, acquirers, and owners of
property.32

32

For similar arguments, see Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Mack, “The Natural
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(B) The ability to bring about property rights also serves our welfare-based
interests. One reason is that the autonomy-based considerations above have a clear
welfare component as well. Securing the resources we need to survive, enjoy a
range of genuine options, and develop projects increases our welfare greatly.
But the welfare interests served by property rights go well beyond this. Life
in a society with a well-functioning system of property has enormous advantages.
Most importantly, such systems provide great material benefits to all. The ways in
which they do so are well-known. Property rights give consumers – those with
intimate knowledge of their wants and needs – decision-making authority over what
resources they acquire, possess, and use. And property rights give producers – those
with intimate knowledge of their productive capacities – both the decision-making
authority over how resources are allocated and the incentives to produce what
consumers want. The result is high levels of production with finely matched output
and demand, which benefit all.33
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that these results require
robust protections of individual rights of possession, use, and exchange. It is no
exaggeration to say that there has never been a society that has managed to achieve
Right of Property”, John T. Sanders, “Projects and Property”, in David Schmidtz, ed., Robert
Nozick, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 34–58, Margaret Radin, "Property
and Personhood," Stanford Law Review 34 (1982): 957–1014, A. John Simmons, The Lockean
Theory of Rights, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 275, and John Tomasi,
Free Market Fairness, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
33 For similar arguments, see David Schmidtz, “The Institution of Property”, Social
Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994), p. 46, F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”,
American Economic Review 35 (1945): 519-30, among many others. Unsurprisingly, Article
17(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts the right to property. Similar to
my argument here, James Nickel defends this human right, including the right to “legitimate
acquisition”, because it is “necessary to promoting and protecting fundamental human
interests”. See James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights 2nd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2006), pp. 123-5.
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and sustain significant levels of prosperity and material welfare without a system of
property containing at least these kinds of rights. They are among the basic building
blocks of prosperity.34
Given the important interests in living under a well-functioning system of
property, we all have great interests in being able to bring about and participate in
such a system. This provides a second interest in the power to appropriate. The
ability to appropriate gives people the means to initiate the transition from a
condition in which no property rights exist to a condition in which they do. And it
does so while enabling us to simultaneously serve the interests listed under (A)
above.
(C) These are but some of the ways in which the ability to bring about
property rights serves our morally important interests. However, the case for the
natural right to own property requires something more. After all, unilateral
appropriation is only one among several possible ways of bringing about property
rights. To complete the first step of the interest-based argument, then, we must
show that a unilateral ability serves our important interests better than alternative
ways of acquiring property that are consistent with moral equality. I will do this by
comparing the natural conditional right to Pufendorf’s consent requirement and the
Kantian demand for a legitimate political condition. The argument here will be that
only unilateral appropriation can serve the interests above.

For an impressive overview and argument, see Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Why
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (New York: Crown Business,
2012)
34

26

The natural conditional right offers some clear advantages. Most importantly,
it provides a realistic prospect of the interests listed under (A) and (B) being served.
The ability to appropriate directly gives people the means to bring about property
rights, thereby enabling them to serve these interests. The natural conditional right
thus aligns the satisfaction of people’s own interests, listed under (A), with the
satisfaction of the interests of all, listed under (B).35
Compared to this, Pufendorf’s requirement that the duties correlative to new
property rights must be self-imposed through universal consent is unpromising.36
For such a requirement cannot realistically be fulfilled. As Locke famously wrote,
‘[i]f such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the
plenty God had given him.’37 Thus Pufendorf’s consent-requirement fails to serve
the interests in (A) and (B) as well as the natural conditional right.
The Kantian alternative that rightful appropriation requires a civil or political
condition deserves to be taken more seriously. This is clearly better than
Pufendorf’s requirement. For no doubt the prospects of a Kantian state are better
than those of universal consent. Nevertheless, the Kantian demand still fails to
enable many people to serve their property-related interests. This is most clearly
true for those unfortunate enough to find themselves not living under organized
political rule, such as the inhabitants of so-called failed states. The Kantian
Stronger, because people will be able to keep what they find, the right also offers people
an incentive to engage in searching behavior. This will likely bring more valuable resources
within the realm of owned objects and thus lead to better material prospects for all. See
Boudewijn Bouckaert, “Original Assignment of Private Property”, in Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit de Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II: Civil Law and Economics,
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), p. 12.
36 For a more recent statement, see Gibbard, “Natural Property Rights”.
37 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, section 28
35
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requirement seems to imply that such people cannot enjoy valid property rights. But
when these people are forced off their land, when their crops and possessions are
taken away or destroyed, their important interests are nonetheless crucially set
back. No less than anyone else – and perhaps more – such people need the
protections and abilities afforded by property rights.38
Things get worse for the Kantian position if the conditions under which the
existence of a political condition legitimizes appropriation become more
demanding. It seems plausible that positive law cannot adequately represent the
wills of its subjects unless the state has certain morally relevant characteristics,
such as being democratic. But if the Kantian demand is for a democratic state, then
the vast majority of people throughout history have been unable to enjoy genuine
property rights. Again this means that their interests would remain frustrated.39
The natural right to own property avoids these problems because it frees
appropriators from the need to secure the consent of others or await the creation of
legitimate political institutions. It thus serves our important interests better than
these rival proposals. This establishes a prima facie case in favor of the natural right
to own property.
Some interpreters of Kant may find this unpersuasive, stressing that Kant allows for
“provisional” property rights in these cases. However, the present argument is not intended
as a critique of Kant, but a critique of a line of thought that certain authors have found in
Kant. I am not sure how to understand such “provisional” rights. But the point in the text
can be stated as follows: if unilaterally established “provisional” rights do not impose
morally valid duties on others, then the argument in the text applies. And if they do, then
their creation is relevantly similar to the kind of appropriation defended here.
39 The problem runs deeper still. Even when such a state exists, its laws can unite or
represent only the wills of fellow citizens. Thus, persons only enjoy genuine property rights
vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. As Anna Stilz, defending a Kantian view, writes: ‘[the
obligations correlative to property rights] bind only those subjected in common to a
legitimate political authority’. See Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, p. 99. Even in this fortunate
condition, therefore, our interests are served to only a limited extent.
38
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To complete this case, we must successfully complete the second step of our
argument. Are there compelling reasons against holding people under conditional
duties to respect the things others appropriate? The most significant concern here is
that the possibility of unilateral appropriation might result in an external world that
is exhaustively owned. In such a world, people who did not appropriate themselves
could end up without the possibility of acquiring or even using property. After all,
owners might deny them access.
This possibility is problematic for two reasons. First, these people’s interests
would be significantly threatened. For unless owners grant them access to their
property, these people will be without a place to go, without the ability to provide
for their necessities, without the ability to undertake personal projects, and so on.
This undercuts the case for the natural right, which depends on its ability to satisfy
these interests for all.
Second, this possibility threatens to undo the commitment to moral equality
around which the case for the natural right to own property is organized. Equality, I
have argued, implies that people cannot determine the content of morality as such
for others. Individuals lack powers of duty-creation because such powers would
enable them to do just that: legislate what morality requires. However, the scenario
above shows another, more indirect way in which individuals can do the same. If
Andy can exercise his natural rights to property so as to deny Beth the possibility of
exercising hers altogether, then Andy can still effectively determine Beth’s moral
options. The problem here is the same. By deciding whether Beth may acquire
property at all, Andy manages to determine whether Beth can enjoy her natural
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right to own property, and thus in an important sense the content of morality for
Beth. Moral equals lack this ability.
To avoid these problems, a number of qualifying conditions must be
introduced into the natural right to own property (referred to as conditions C in the
description of the right above). Some of these qualifications are suggested by Locke,
the most famous of which is that acts of appropriation should leave “enough and as
good” for others to appropriate. Another is that the regular property rights that
result from appropriation will have similar enduring qualifications attached.
Property rights, on this view, cannot be used to exclude others from acquiring
property altogether. For we cannot successfully insist on them against those who
have nothing at all.40
These qualifications have the same underlying rationale. The point of the
natural right to own property is to enable persons to become owners and thereby
serve their important interests. The point of the right’s qualifying conditions is to
ensure that everyone has that ability to serve these interests. Given that there is, as I
have argued, a genuine continuity between the natural conditional right to own
property and the eventual regular property rights enjoyed by individuals, we should

Locke defended these qualifications in sections II, 33 and I, 42 of his Two Treatises of
Government. See also Nozick’s remarks about “the shadow” of the Lockean Proviso, Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 180-1. Note that this
proviso is entailed by the logic of the duties correlative to property rights. If the world were
exhaustively appropriated, and all owners denied a propertyless person access to their land,
this person would be faced with moral duties of non-trespass that she cannot satisfy. But
“ought implies can” entails that one cannot be under duties that one cannot but breach. See
Hillel Steiner, “Responses”, in S. de Wijze, M. Kramer & I. Carter, eds., Hillel Steiner and the
Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 241.
40
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expect its qualifications to have the same continuity. These are the same rights
qualified by the same conditions C.41
The kinds of property acquisition that can satisfy these qualifying conditions
will be those that serve the interests listed above. The possibility of unilateral
acquisition serves these interests in important ways – ways that help justify the
natural right to own property. But other (complimentary) forms of acquisition can
serve these interests as well. The interests we have in a right to appropriate
unilaterally are a special case of the more general interests we have in a right to
acquire property. So we might expect that the availability of different forms of
acquisition can satisfy the natural right’s conditions C. Perhaps there need be no
denial of the right to own property, then, if one can acquire property through
exchange or labor, even when one cannot acquire property through unilateral
appropriation.
Of course a number of highly complex questions arise about the precise
nature of these qualifying conditions. How much must be available for people to
acquire for these conditions to be satisfied? If one can only acquire property
through exchange or labor, and not unilateral appropriation, do additional
conditions apply? Do any of these qualifications license third parties to act on behalf
of those who lack access to property? And so on. Much of the natural right’s practical
implications will depend on the answers to these questions. Fortunately, however,

Other qualifications might apply as well, such as adverse possession. One qualification is
almost too obvious to mention: the objects that can be acquired through unilateral
appropriation must be unowned at the time of appropriation. Again, this qualification is
internal to the natural right because, without it, the right could not serve the relevant
important interests.
41
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we do not need to answer them in detail here. The point of this article is to establish
the possibility of unilateral appropriation of property, not a complete account of
distributive justice or even a full account of Lockean property rights. So for now it
will suffice to note that suitable versions of these qualifications will remove the
worries above. They preclude that those who get their appropriations in first can
use their property rights to prevent others from acquiring property altogether. As
such, they guarantee that the natural right to own property cannot be used to deny
others the enjoyment of their own natural rights (as demanded by moral equality),
or prevent others from having their property-related interests served (as demanded
by the interest-theory of rights).42
The natural right to own property thus serves people’s crucially important
interests without imposing unreasonable burdens on others. This is sufficient to
justify holding people under correlative conditional duties. We can conclude, then,
that all persons have a conditional right to own property. And because they do, all
persons can acquire regular property rights over objects by performing acts that
satisfy this right’s condition.
5. Conclusion
I have asked whether original appropriation is consistent with the fact that, among

One might think that these qualifications imply a role for the state as either the one
executing these provisos or the one specifying them in the face of disagreement and conflict.
But while the state might be sufficient for carrying out these tasks, it is not necessary. In
principle, at least, people can appropriate and enjoy property, subject to due qualifications,
without the existence of a state. Such a condition will obviously have many practical
problems and inconveniences, including perhaps ones that can only be addressed in
organized ways. But none of this implies that property rights presuppose a state. Thus, the
heart of the Lockean position I have sought to defend stands.
42
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moral equals, no one can determine the content of morality for others. The
argument for the wide-scoped conditional right to own property shows that original
appropriation is consistent with this ideal of moral equality. Appropriation does not
presuppose duty-creation because the regular property rights that result correlate
to duties that are detached from prior conditional duties. So people who appropriate
property are not determining the content of morality for others. Moreover, because
of the qualifications internal to the natural right to own property, its exercise cannot
preclude others from acquiring property as well. So appropriation does not allow
individuals to indirectly determine the content of morality for others either.
The natural right to own property gives people the ability to appropriate and
enjoy property side by side. We can all be property owners and appropriators at the
same time. But not all possible conditional rights can be jointly enjoyed in this way.
This is one reason why the Lockean can insist that there is an important difference
between original appropriation and political authority. For even though both
appropriation and authority involve the (purported) unilateral imposition of duties,
and even though it is in principle possible to construct a wide-scope right to be an
authority, the unilateral ability to assert oneself as a political authority for others
cannot be jointly enjoyed by all. At least on standard views of such authority, we
cannot all enjoy it at the same time. Therefore, unilateral political authority is
incompatible with moral equality.43

There might be, as an anonymous referee suggests, a natural right to be an equal member
of a democratic government. I cannot here pursue this thought in detail. If this is correct,
then the Lockean has to either abandon the strict consent theory of authority or provide it
with an alternative foundation.
43
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Appendix
The argument above, recall, relies on the following syllogism:
(i)

For all persons A and B at times t1 and t2, A has a right against B that [B
respect A as the rightful owner of O at t2 on the condition that A performs
appropriative act P on object O under conditions C at t1].

(ii)

A performs P on O under conditions C at t1

(iii)

Therefore, A has a right against B that B respect A as the rightful owner of
O at t2

This argument presupposes the validity of what is called detachment from widescoped conditional rights. Since such detachment can be problematic, this appendix
explains why the argument above is valid.44
An argument involves detachment from a wide-scope conditional right when
it contains a right that a conditional obtains (the “wide-scope” conditional right),
and tries to derive a right to the consequent of the conditional (contained within the
wide-scope right) by asserting that the antecedent of the conditional is satisfied.
That is, an argument involves detachment from a wide-scope conditional right when
it tries to derive a conclusion like (iii) from premises like (i) and (ii).
In some cases detachment from wide-scope conditional obligations is invalid.
To see this, consider the following closely analogous argument:

For an objection to arguments like the one developed in this article based on the
problems with wide-scope detachment, see Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p. 121.
The discussion here applies to rights and correlative duties the general discussion of “iffy
oughts” in Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1986) and Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation.
44
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(i*)

For all persons A and B, A has a right against B that [q on the condition
that r].

(ii*)

r

(iii*) Therefore, A has a right against B that q
This second argument is invalid. The problem is that both the conclusion (iii*) and
“A has a right against B that not-r” are consistent with premises (i*) and (ii*). That
is, A might have a right that B q, or A might have a right that B not-r. Thus, we cannot
validly detach A’s right that B q from the wide-scope right in premise (i*) and the
factual antecedent of that right’s conditional in (ii*).
The argument of this article does not suffer from the same problem. The
main reason is that it is indexed to time. If (i) at t1 A has a right that [B respects A as
the rightful owner of object O at t2 on the condition that A performs appropriative
act P on object O under conditions C at t1], and (ii) at t1 A performs P under
conditions C, then (iii) it does follow that at t2 A has a right that B respect A’s
property right over O (assuming that at t2 A still has RA,B[Ot2/Pt1]).45 The reason is
that it is impossible for B at t2 to make it the case that A did not perform his
appropriative act at t1. And because this is impossible, B cannot (at t2) be obligated
to do so. And because B cannot be obligated to do so, A cannot (at t2) have the
correlative right. Therefore, the conclusion in (iii) follows. The argument is valid.

This assumption is plausible given that the right in question is a natural right. Even
though natural rights can be forfeited or alienated, in the standard case A can be assumed to
continue to enjoy it.
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